As the will to deploy neural network models on embedded systems grows, and considering the related memory footprint and energy consumption requirements, finding lighter solutions to store neural networks such as parameter quantization and more efficient inference methods becomes major research topics. Parallel to that, adversarial machine learning has risen recently, unveiling some critical flaws of machine learning models, especially neural networks. In particular, perturbed inputs called adversarial examples have been shown to fool a model into making incorrect predictions. In this paper, we investigate the adversarial robustness of quantized neural networks under different attacks. We show that quantization is not a robust protection when considering advanced threats and may result in severe form of gradient masking which leads to a false impression of security. However, and interestingly, we experimentally observe poor transferability capacities between full-precision and quantized models and between models with different quantization levels which we explain by the quantization value shift phenomenon and gradient misalignment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Neural networks achieve state-of-the art performances in various domains such as speech translation or image recognition. These outstanding performances have been allowedamong others -by tremendous computation power (e.g. popularization of GPU). The resulting trained architectures come with thousands or even millions of parameters. Alongside the steady research based on the performance of deeper networks, major efforts are focused on the deployment of machine learning models, predominantly to run pre-trained neural network based applications on embedded systems. This deployment involves complex practical issues related to the architectural constraints of the hardware targets. First of all, the memory footprint can quickly be a limiting factor for constrained devices. For example, a typical ARM Cortex-M4-based microcontroller such as STM32F4 has up to 384 KBytes RAM and a maximum of 2MBytes of Flash memory. Secondly, inference cost in terms of energy is critical for devices like mobile phones or a large variety of connected objects such as industrial sensors ; and inference speed is usually a strong requirement to avoid critical latency issues.
In this context, some APIs like the Android Neural Network API NNAPI [1] have been already developed to allow to run efficiently models trained with popular frameworks (e.g. Tensorflow or Caffe) on Android systems. Tensorflow Lite [2] allows to transfer pre-trained models to mobile or embedded devices thanks to model compression techniques and optional 8-bit post-training weights quantization. ARM-NN [3] is another SDK that does the link for applications between various machine learning frameworks and diverse Cortex CPUs or Mali GPUs types as well as CMSIS-NN [4] dedicated to Cortex-M MCU. On a more theoretical side, research about reducing the number of parameters and as a result the memory footprint of models [5] - [9] , or developing quantization schemes coupled with efficient computation methods to reduce inference time and energy consumption [10] - [18] has arisen. At the same time, neural networks have been shown to be vulnerable to malicious tampering of inputs [19] , [20] . From a clean observation that is well classified by a model, an adversary can craft a so-called adversarial example, which is very similar to the clean observation and will fool the model. Many attack methods [19] - [24] and defense methods [25] - [30] related to adversarial examples have been developed and evaluated in benchmarks or competition tracks such as the NIPS Adversarial Vision Challenge.
As embedded systems with neural networks models become ubiquitous, it is a particularly interesting topic to evaluate and understand the robustness of state-of-the-art quantization methods under different threat models.
The main contribution of this paper is twofolds:
• we show that quantization in itself offers poor protection against various well-known adversarial crafting methods. We explain why activation quantization can lead to severe gradient masking [23] , a phenomenon which leads to nonuseful gradients to craft adversarial examples and causes ineffective defense [31] , [32] ; • we demonstrate very poor transferability capacities of adversarial examples between full-precision and quantized models, and between quantized models with different bitwidth levels, and advance hypotheses to explain it. To our knowledge, this work is the first to study to that scale (two data sets, five state-of-the-art attacks covering white-box and black-box settings) the relationship between quantization and adversarial robustness, and highlight results regarding gradient masking and transferability that we consider as important for the design of future defense schemes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the background on neural network quantization methods and adversarial examples. Section III reviews the literature concerning both adversarial examples and neural network quantization. Section IV describes the experiments performed to evaluate the robustness against adversarial examples of quantized neural networks. Section V details results of these experiments. Eventually we conclude in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Notations
A neural network maps sample x from the input space R d to the output space {1, 2, ...C}, with C the number of classes. The weight parameters will be indistinctly noted w. f : R d → R C is the scoring function (here the softmax function), logit : R d → R C the pre-softmax function (the logits), and J the loss function whom the network was trained with. Given a function g :
B. Neural network quantization
Following the goal of solving the memory footprint and inference cost issues for embedded neural networks, a lot of research aims at reducing the precision of the weights combined with suitable low-bitwidth arithmetic for efficient inference.
1) Post-training quantization: As mentioned in the introduction, several tools have been recently proposed to map full precision pre-trained models for inference purpose by coarsely quantizing some weights into -usually -no more than 8-bit integers. More advanced methods propose clustering methods [9] , vector quantization methods [7] or pruning [6] . All these post-training quantization methods may suffer from severe accuracy alteration.
2) Quantization-aware training: Many techniques have been proposed to train a neural network while enforcing low-bitwidth representations of parameters [33] . Depending on the methods, it can involve the quantization of weights, activations or gradients. Weights and activations are quantized on the forward pass, and gradients on the backward pass. The quantization function of weights and activations can be not differentiable or its derivative can be null almost everywhere. This implies computation feasibility issues or vanishing gradient problems for the backpropagation algorithm. To solve this issue, a Straigth Through Estimator (hereafter STE, [34] ) is used. A STE consists of a feasible approximation of the intractable true derivative. As the network has been trained to do so, inference can later be done with quantized values only.
We focus hereunder on two referenced methods that allow to take advantage of the low bitwidth values format to implement faster inference methods since convolutions can be defined with bitwise operations (i.e., xnor and bitcount, see [10] , [11] and [16] for details).
Binarized models. In [10] , Courbariaux et al. present the BinaryConnect method to train neural networks with weights w binarized to w b = sign(w). The STE given in Equation 1 is used for the backward pass:
where and a number of bits n, the function r o = round((2 n −1)ri)
is the core quantization function used for weights, activation values and gradients. The authors propose different STE following the same principle as in (1) (for conciseness purpose, we refer interested readers to [16] for details). They show that the impact of quantization on the accuracy level is highly sensitive to gradients (up to 4 bits) then -following this sensitivity order -noticeably less to activations and weights. Moreover, they highlight the impact of large-scale dataset (such as ImageNet) and network architecture (reducing the channels of convolutional layers decreases the accuracy of quantized models).
C. Adversarial examples
As revealed in a large amount of works, the machine learning pipeline can be threatened at every stage (training and inference) with attacks targeting the confidentiality, integrity or accessibility of the machine learning system [35] . As for any security analysis, a first and compulsory step is to define a threat model that encompasses the adversary's goal, capacities and knowledge. 1) Threat model: The adversary goal is to fool a supervised model at inference time (integrity-based attack). From a clean observation x correctly classified as y, the adversary wants to craft an adversarial example x classified as a precise class t = y (targeted attacks) or any class y = y (untargeted attacks).
The adversarial capability is defined as an upper bound of the distance D(x, x ) between a clean observation x and the adversarial example x crafted from x. The distance D is usually derived from the l 2 or l ∞ norms.
For the adversarial knowledge, when considering a whitebox setting, the adversary is assumed to have a full access to the target model. In the black-box setting we assume a realistic scenario where an adversary knows the model architecture and can query it without limitation with a full access to the outputs. Moreover, since we use classical image collections, we assume that the attacker has access to the same dataset. Therefore, the adversary can train his own substitute model (full-precision or quantized), and transfer adversarial examples crafted on it on the target model (full-precision or quantized).
2) Attacks:
We focus on bounded untargeted attacks and present the five state-of-the-art attacks which will be considered in this work. We sum up their main characteristics in table I.
Gradient-based methods have been developed for an adversary in a white-box setting:
• FGSM ATTACK [20] . Goodfellow et al. propose the following simple, well-spread, one-step crafting method:
This method indeed derives the optimal x maximizing J(w, x , y) − J(w, x, y), for x − x ∞ ≤ , under a linear approximation. • BIM ATTACK [36] . This attack extends the previous one with an iterative approach:
where Clip B∞(x, ) designates the clipping onto the l ∞ ball of center x and radius , and α is a chosen step-size. • CWL2 ATTACK [21] . Carlini and Wagner consider the following objective function to craft l 2 bounded adversarial examples:
where:
with κ ≥ 0, c > 0. With this attack, the adversary aims at minimizing the l 2 distortion between the clean and adversarial examples, while ensuring misclassification. Gradient-free methods are focused on the black-box setting by estimating the gradient as it is not available to the adversary:
• SPSA ATTACK [31] : Uesato et al. propose a gradient-free attack suitable for black box settings by considering the following optimization problem:
This attack approximates the gradients with finite difference estimates thanks to the SPSA technique (Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation, [37] ), which is known to be efficient for noisy high dimensional optimization problems. • ZOO ATTACK [24] is a gradient-free variation of the CWl2 attack. It considers the same optimization problem as in Equation 4 , except that the softmax function f is considered instead of the logits. The following finite difference method is used for gradient approximation:
where F ZOO is the softmax equivalent of F in (4), e i is a standard basis vector with only the i th component as 1, and h = 0.0002. 3) Defenses: Simultaneously to the design and analysis of adversarial attacks, various defense strategies have been proposed. As we do not intent to study and compare specific protection schemes in this paper, we refer to the review of Serban et al. [38] . With some of these defense methods may appear a phenomenon called gradient masking [23] . Gradient masking can be briefly summarized as making gradients useless to find an adversarial example, thus tampering the efficiency of gradient-based attacks. This is due to gradients not pointing in the direction of adversarial examples or more generally to the fact that the output function of the target model is difficult to optimize over. Gradient masking has to be understood as a false sense of security [31] , [32] , as it does not make the target model more robust in itself. Indeed, the target model is not less sensitive to adversarial examples, but simply prevents some attacks to find existing adversarial examples. Defenses inducing gradient masking have been shown vulnerable to gradient-free attacks and transfer-based attacks (the adversary trains a substitute model to craft adversarial examples on, and then transfer them on the target model) [39] .
III. RELATED WORK
In [40] , Galloway et al. claim that neural networks trained with weights and activation values binarized to {−1, 1} have an interesting robustness against adversarial examples. However, this robustness was demonstrated using only the MNIST dataset and one simple gradient-based attack (FGSM [20] , see II-C2), and use stochastic quantization. This quantization scheme induces the stochastic gradient phenomenon [32] , which can mislead to the true efficiency of this defense by causing what [31] called obscurity. In [41] , Lin et al. try to explain some weaknesses of quantization-based defense methods against adversarial examples. They show experimentally that these defense methods can in fact denoise an adversarial example or enlarge its perturbation, depending on the size of the perturbation in the input space and the number of bits used for quantization. Thus, quantization can participate in an error amplification or attenuation effect. However, they only apply the FGSM attack in a white-box setting against simple activation quantization. Although focused on model compression (pruning), [42] analyze the robustness of quantized neural networks against adversarial examples with a fixed-point quantization scheme applies to both weight and activation values (no less than 4-bit model) and a restricted set of gradient-based attacks. In [43] , Rakin et al. propose a defense method based on activation quantization coupled with adversarial training [25] , which has been shown in [41] to introduce gradient masking. Interestingly, in [44] , Khalil et al. note that the gradients obtained via the STE may not be representative of the true gradient. This observation leads to questions about efficiency of gradient-based attacks against quantized neural networks, and strengthens up the motivation to study gradient masking issues and black-box attacks against such networks as proposed in this paper. The authors propose a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) based attack, which shows good results on the MNIST data set but is not scalable to large neural networks, due to computation cost issues.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We conduct our experiments on CIFAR10 and SVHN, two classical natural scene image datasets. CIFAR10 is composed of 60,000 images, with 10 classes. We use a training set of size 50,000 and a testing set of 10,000. The SVHN dataset is composed of 99,289 images, with 10 classes. We use a training set of size 73,257 and a testing test of 26,032. For each dataset, we trained a full-precision (32-bit floating point) neural network, and various quantized neural networks. The architecture is the one presented in [11] . It consists of convolutional blocks, each of them being the stack of a convolution layer, a batch-normalization layer and the ReLU activation function, followed by dense blocks being a stack of a dense layer, a batch-normalization layer and the ReLU activation function. Contrary to [11] , we chose the softmax activation function for the top layer, and models are trained with the cross-entropy loss, as we found it to converge faster. The optimization is done with Adam using a staircase decay for the learning rate. Each model has about 10M parameters.
Four different low-bitwidth quantization are considered: 1,2,3 and 4 bits. For each of them, we consider quantizing only the weights (weight-only quantization) or the weights and the output of each convolutional or dense block, i.e. activations (full quantization). For the weight binarization (1bit quantization), we use the Binary Connect method [10] . For the 1-bit full quantization, we use the Binary Net method [11] and for the 2-bit, 3-bit and 4-bit quantization, we use the Dorefa Net method [16] previously described. The input layer and the last dense layer are not quantized, to allow an efficient training as recommended in [11] and discussed in [16] .
Test set accuracy results are presented in Table II . Quantization does not affect significantly the accuracy, except for fully binarized models which achieve only 0.79 and 0.89 accuracy on CIFAR10 and SVHN respectively, which represents a non negligible drop of performance. For quantized models with more than 1 bit, the test set accuracy is comparable to the one obtained for full-precision models. These results are consistent with [11] and [16] . Note that Hubara et al. [11] explain the performance of binarized networks with a regularization effect brought by quantization and Zhou et al. [16] show that the architecture as well as the size of the dataset can have an impact on the performance of quantized networks .
The attacks presented in II-C2 were used. For the FGSM attack we set = 0.03. For the BIM attack we set = 0.03, 100 iterations and α = 0.0003. For the CWl2 and ZOO attack, we set 100 iterations, κ = 0 and 10 binary search steps for the optimal c.
V. RESULTS
A. Direct attacks
Results of direct attacks against models with full quantization and weight-only quantization are presented in Tables III and IV. We report adversarial accuracy (i.e. the accuracy of the target model on adversarial examples, the higher it is the more robust the target model is), together with the l 2 and l ∞ distortions of successful adversarial examples.
Robustness of binarized models. We first observe in Table III that fully binarized models are far more robust to FGSM and BIM attacks than their full-precision counterparts, as already noted by [40] . However, the CWl2 attack is almost as efficient against fully binarized models as against full-precision ones. Therefore, fully-binarized neural networks do not bring much robustness improvement compared to full-precison models against gradient-based attacks, as claimed in [40] . For full quantization with more than 1 bit, the robustness increase is more noticeable for the FGSM attack on SVHN only. We also note that fully binarized models are relatively more robust to the SPSA attack as well. This, combined with the slightly poorer performance of the CWl2 attack on binarized models, indicates that the loss surface for binarized models is more difficult to optimize over.
Activation quantization causes gradient masking. Interestingly, we see in Table III that the ZOO attack fails very often to produce adversarial examples when attacking fully quantized neural networks. More precisely, we note that when adversarial examples are crafted on a full-precision model, ZOO and CWl2 reach almost the same adversarial accuracy, with slightly higher l 2 distortion for ZOO. However, when adversarial examples are crafted on a model with quantized weights and activations, we note that the adversarial accuracy is higher with ZOO than with CWl2, but that successful adversarial examples crafted with ZOO have much lower l 2 distortion than the ones crafted with CWl2 as well as the one observed for the full-precision model (l 2 = 0.72). Firstly, the almost equal performance of ZOO compared to CWl2 for a full-precision model is expected as gradient-free attacks are supposed to perform worse than their gradientbased counterparts when no gradient masking is allowed. Secondly, we argue that the phenomenon observed on full quantization models is due to gradient masking and the STE technique involved during the training. We explain this by distinguishing two cases:
• ZOO fails to produce successful adversarial examples and CWl2 succeeds: (1) because of the activation quantization, a little change (he i ) may switch the activation value from one quantization bucket to another, inducing a big change in the predicted softmax values, causing the discrete derivative F d ZOO (x) to explode; (2) on the contrary, this change can also have no impact (keep values in the same bucket), which results in F ZOO (x − he i , y) = F ZOO (x + he i , y), causing the discrete derivative F d ZOO (x) to be null. To sum up, F ZOO presents some sharp curvatures or flatness around some points, caused by activation quantization, which prevents ZOO to build successful adversarial examples. The CWl2 attack avoids this problem as it computes gradients thanks to a STE, even if the gradient computed may not be exactly the same as the true gradient [44] . • Both ZOO and CWl2 succeed to produce successful adversarial examples: the l 2 distortion for the successful adversarial examples produced by ZOO is smaller than the one produced by CWl2. Around these points the surface of the objective function to optimize does not present any sharp curvature or flatness. Both ZOO and CWl2 do not suffer from the local minima problem, but as noted by [44] , the gradients computed by the CWl2 attack is not representative of the true gradient. The gradient being better estimated by the ZOO attack, it explains its success (lower l 2 distortion). The gradient masking phenomenon hypothesis concerning the quantization of activation values is also verified with the fact that the SPSA attack (a gradient-free attack) performs quite better in terms of adversarial accuracy than the BIM attack, against fully binarized models. We also make the hypothesis that SPSA avoids the sharp curvatures or flatness observed around some points, where ZOO fails to produce adversarial examples, because of the more efficient gradient estimation method suited to noisy objective functions [31] .
For the weight quantized models results presented in Table  TABLE IV  GRADIENT-BASED AND GRADIENT-FREE ATTACKS AGAINST FULL- IV, we do not observe the same phenomena as for the full quantization models. No apparent robustness is noticeable for the weight quantized models. No sharp variation or flatness is induced for the objective function of the ZOO attack of the weight quantized models, as it originated from the quantization of activation values. It has to be noted that we also measured that the variance of the logits values between full-precision and weight-only quantized models is almost the same.
B. Transferability
We present results of transferability for CIFAR10 when the source network (i.e. the models the adversarial examples are crafted from) is full-precision, fully or weight-only binarized models, and the adversarial examples are transferred to (target models) full-precision, fully or weight-only quantized networks, in Fig. 1 . Results for SVHN are similar to that of CIFAR10, they are not presented. The results for the cases where the source networks are 2-bit or 4-bit quantized models are not presented here as they can be interpolated from the one we present. For the CWl2 attack, as adviced in [21] , we consider κ > 0 to build strong adversarial examples on the source model, more likely to transfer. We tested κ = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 . For each source model, we report the best transferability results.
In Fig. 1 we see that transferability results are quite poor for the FGSM, BIM and SPSA attacks. The CWl2 attack, given tuning the parameter κ, suffers less from transferability issues, except when the source or target network is a fully binarized network. Indeed, for the κ values tested, when the source network is a fully binarized model, the CWl2 attack struggles to find adversarial examples having both F (x + , y) < 0 (see Equation 4 ) and a little l 2 distortion. This results in adversarial examples being missclassified at the cost of a large (thus, detectable) alteration. We hypothesize that this failure comes from the hard to optimize loss function as noted in V-A. When the source network is a fully binarized model, the results reported are for κ = 5. We also note that, as already noticed by [45] , and contrary to what was initially found by [36] , the BIM attack, as it is the case here, may produce more transferable adversarial examples than the FGSM attack.
Quantization shift phenomenon. These poor transferability results for the FGSM, BIM and SPSA attacks can be explained on one hand because quantization can map two different values into the same bucket, which ruins the adversarial effect. It is particularly obvious when quantization is applied to activation values. In case of weight-only quantization, this levelling effect may even reverse the order of activation values for some pair {x, x } of clean input and associated adversarial example. Consequently, whatever the quantization level of the source model adversarial examples are crafted on, evaluating them on a target model with a different quantization level may hinder their efficiency because of the quantization shift phenomenon.
Gradient misalignment. Regarding transferability results, we may also hypothesize that gradient directions differ between full-precision models and quantized models and between quantized models with different bitwidth levels. This misalignment may be noticeable for the gradient computed with the STE, as poor transferability is observed for the gradient-based attacks, and for the real gradient, as poor transferability is observed for the SPSA attack. To confirm this hypothesis, we measure the mean cosine similarity between the gradient of the loss function with respect to the input between full-precision and quantized models. Results for CIFAR10 are presented in Fig. 2 . Similar results have been observed for In Fig. 2 , we first observe that the cosine similarity values for gradients between full-precision and quantized models and between quantized models with different bitwidth levels, are relatively close to 0. This indicates nearly orthogonal gradient directions particularly between fully-binarized models and others models. This is in accordance with the results presented in Fig. 1 where transferability capacities for the FGSM, BIM, CWl2 and SPSA attacks are the poorest when fully-binarized models are involved.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper we showed experimentally -using CIFAR10 and SVHN collections and state-of-the-art gradient-based and gradient-free attacks -that quantization in itself offers a weak protection against adversarial examples crafted by an adversary having access to the model or able to query it. To our knowledge, it is the first analysis of that scale.
We found that activation quantization actually leads to gradient masking, which can lessen some attacks' efficiency but is easily thwarted by attacks relying on gradient approximations or pure gradient-free attacks. Eventually, we demonstrated some poor transferability capacities between classical models Cosine similarity values between the gradient of the loss function with respect to the input, for full-precision and quantized models. w i a j designates a model with a i bits weight quantization and a j bits activation quantization. and quantized models, and between quantized models with different bitwidth levels, an interesting result for designing protections against black-box attacks. We explain this by the quantization shift phenomenon, that ruins adversarial effects, and gradients misalignment induced by quantization.
As an important outcome of these experiments, we believe that the characteristics of embedded models particularly induced by quantization approaches (weights or activation) have to be taken into consideration in order to design suitable and efficient protection schemes. These defense strategies for embedded models will be the purpose of future works, since robustness requirements will obviously become more and more compulsory as critical tasks are performed thanks to a growing variety of devices.
